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Administrative Appeal or Judicial Review:
A Canadian Perspective
JOHN M EVANS*
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
I INTRODUCTION
In this paper I shall describe the Canadian experience, which has a
variety of mechanisms for providing persons who are dissatisfied with an
administrative decision an opportunity to have it reconsidered by a
tribunal that is independent of the original decision-maker. I shall briefly
assess the operation of these arrangements, and extract some general
principles and pragmatic considerations that may be relevant to the
construction of administrative machinery in the new South Africa. In
addition to administrative review, I consider an appropriate role for the
judiciary, including proposals to entrench in the new South African
constitution the right to judicial review. As will become apparent, I
regard administrative appeals and judicial review, not as mutually
exclusive, but rather as complementary means of enhancing administra-
tive justice.
It may be useful, though, to indicate at the outset some of the forces
that seem to me to be currently operating on public administration, both
in Canada, and, I suspect, in many other countries that draw from a
common pool of constitutional tradition and political culture. Thinking
about the exercise of administrative power in the common-law world has
long been conditioned by four constitutional principles.
The first is that administrative justice at the level of the individualized
decision is best served by a system of specialized review tribunals
operating within an essentially adjudicative model of procedure.' The
second is that, in a parliamentary system of government, accountability
for the exercise of political power is adequately secured through the
doctrine of ministerial responsibility, in its differing dimensions.2 Third,
and related to the second, is the notion that it is illegitimate to confer on
public institutions policy-making power for which there is no day-to-
* BA BCL (Oxon), Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Canada. I am very grateful to the organizers of the Workshop for inviting me to participate,
and to Hugh Corder in particular, a gracious and generous host, and an administrator of the
highest order. I am also pleased to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in defraying the cost of my airfare.
' This principle was powerfully reaffirmed in England by the Report of the Committee on
Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries Cmnd 218 (1957) (the Franks Report).
2 Over the years various attempts have been made in different jurisdictions to put into
working order a mechanism of accountability that palpably has been unable to meet the
demands put on it by the modem administrative state. These have typically taken the form
of new parliamentary committees to oversee the work of particular government
departments and the making of delegated legislation, and the introduction of the office of
Ombudsman.
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day political accountability of the kind provided by ministerial
responsibility. Fourth, overseeing both the legal and the political
institutions of the administrative state stand the courts of general
jurisdiction, with the power to intervene in the administrative process on
grounds of procedural impropriety, deviation from statutory mandate,
and unreasonableness.
3
It seems to me unlikely that the modern (or should I say
post-modern?) administrative state will be able to derive from these
architectural principles a blueprint for designing institutions and
processes that will meet the challenges facing it. On the basis of our
experience in Canada, I would define as follows the most significant of
these challenges.
Despite the enthusiasm for economic deregulation, which, in any
event never really took hold in Canada to the same extent that it did
under the Reagan administration in the United States and under Thatcher
in the United Kingdom, public opinion has continued to expect
government to play a leading role in tackling the major social issues of
the day, and to attend to many of the problems arising from the
operation of a modern market economy. New or expanded government
programmes have been created in response to demands for gender and
racial equity, health and safety at work, pollution control, consumer
protection and income security, for example. However, two factors
make it particularly difficult to satisfy these continuing and rising public
expectations.
First, there appears to have been a collapse of public confidence both
in the traditional political institutions as authentically representative of
the people, and in the legitimating functions of the traditional political
processes. The rise of the single issue pressure group, demands for more
'direct democracy', and the translation of political claims into legally
enforceable 'rights' are probably both causes and consequences of the
decline of the parliamentary model of government as it has been
understood for most of this century.
Second, at a time of unprecedented debts and deficits in public
finances, a public resistance to increased levels of taxation, and
government commitments to maintaining a low rate of inflation, public
programmes must be delivered within a budget that is at best static, but
more often, shrinking. Learning to satisfy rising public expectations
from fewer resources is likely to occupy the attention of public
administrators for at least the next few years.
Individually and cumulatively these challenges are formidable, not
least because trying to meet one seems almost inevitably to prejudice
another. For example, tackling any of the social problems identified
above requires a public administration that can withstand the political
pressures that the private sector is able to exert on government to resist
' To paraphrase slightly the 'Diplock catalogue' of illegality, procedural impropriety
and unreasonableness: see Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985]
AC 374 at 410.
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regulation of its activities. It can seem difficult to combine the kind of
firmness that may be required for this purpose with demands for
increased openness of decision-making and rights of review by specialist
appellate tribunals or the courts. Moreover, enhanced rights of
participation in government add another strain on resources that are
already spread too thinly. In the absence of public funding or other kinds
of assistance for either public interest groups or vulnerable individuals, it
must be doubtful whether the provision of more opportunities for
formalized administrative hearings can really enhance the democratic
legitimacy of the bureaucracy. And the public funding needed for
effective public participation in administrative hearings held to decide
technically complex and wide-ranging issues of public policy can be very
large indeed. Whether the quality or public acceptability of the decisions
made justify the resources and time devoted to the process is very
questionable. 4
II ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW IN CANADA: AN OVERVIEW
(1) Background
For the last 20 years administrative law reform in Canada has remained
largely in the realm of speculation. There has certainly been no dearth of
reports addressing the shortcomings of our institutional arrangements
for delivering public programmes.5 For example, before its abolition in
1992, the Law Reform Commission of Canada produced a steady stream
of reports on administrative law, ranging widely from studies of the
structure and operation of particular federal agencies, the reform of the
law ofjudicial review, and a proposal for a general code of administrative
procedure, to more speculative pieces on topics such as public liability
and the legal nature of the federal administration. None the less,
legislative implementation has been conspicuously absent at both the
federal and provincial levels of government.
This inertia is partly explained by the resources and energy consumed
over the last ten years by Canada's ongoing constitutional crises
4 In Ontario a hearing was recently held into the estimate by the Province's principal
electricity producer of the likely demand for electrical power over the next 25 years, and its
proposals for meeting the demand. More than 150 individuals and organizations
participated; funding for their expert witnesses and lawyers was provided by the utility
pursuant to the Intervener Funding Project Act RSO 1990 c 1.13. However, despite the
expenditure of $30 million in intervener funding, the hearing was terminated prematurely,
with no outcome; the economic recession had rendered obsolete the utility's demand
projections, and put it into a perilous financial position. See generally on the financing of
public participation: W A Bogart & M Valiante 'Helping "concerned volunteers working
out of their kitchens": funding citizen participation in administrative decision-making'
(1993) 31 Osgoode Hall LJ (forthcoming).
s For a convenient listing of the principal reports, and a brief description of the more
important, see M Priest 'Structure and Accountability of Administrative Agencies' in Law
Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 1992 (1993) (forthcoming).
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surrounding, in particular, the status of Quebec, 6 and partly by
adjustments made following the introduction of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. In addition, administrative law reform that goes
beyond mere tinkering tends to raise questions of political and
bureaucratic sensitivity, especially when it comes to matters such as the
power of ministers to appoint agency members, and any potential
expansion of the power of the Department of Justice in relation to
administrative tribunals.
The last systematic and comprehensive examination of issues of law
and administration in Canada was undertaken by a royal commission in
the late 1960s: the Inquiry into Civil Rights in the Province of Ontario
(the McRuer Report). The most successful of the recommendations
contained in the Report resulted in the introduction in 1971 of a single
procedure to reform the remedies of administrative law: an application
for judicial review replaced the separate proceedings previously needed
for the prerogative orders, and declarations and injunctions. 7
In most other respects, however, the McRuer Report was a dated and
unimaginative document that accepted without question the Diceyan
orthodoxy of the Rule of Law and the strict separation of law and
politics.s Thus, it is assumed that when the state proposed to interfere
with common-law rights of individuals, or to confer statutory benefits,
the legislature should ensure that the conditions of entitlement, denial
and deprivation were defined in the legislation as precisely as possible.
The task of resolving disputed claims was therefore a legal question that
should be given to administrative tribunals operating, in effect, like
junior courts of law. Their procedure was to be adversarial and
adjudicative in form, although without the excesses found in civil
litigation conducted in courts,9 and their determinations of questions of
law were to be subject to judicial review. to
Apart from a nod in the direction of the desirability of the 'expertise'
of specialist tribunals, McRuer had no sympathy at all for the idea that
the tribunal should use its understanding of the programme it was
administering to fill in the inevitable gaps in the statute and to resolve its
6 Despite the agreements for constitutional change by the federal and provincial
governments at Meech Lake in 1987 and at Charlottetown in 1992, neither received the
necessary endorsement: the Meech Lake Agreement was not ratified by all the provincial
legislatures, and the Charlottetown Accord was roundly rejected in a national referendum.
7 Judicial Review Procedure Act RSO 1990 cJ.1.
8 For a critique see J Willis 'The McRuer Report: lawyers' values and civil servants'
values' (1968) 18 U Toronto LJ 351.
9 Another statutory emanation of the Report was the Statutory Powers Procedure Act
RSO 1990 c S.22, a uniform code of administrative procedure applicable to many of
Ontario's tribunals. For proposals for reform that take into account a much broader range
of procedural and structural issues, see Directions: Review of Ontario's Regulatory Agencies
(1989) (the Macaulay Report), chapters 4 and 8.
10 This proposal was not adopted in its entirety. Privative clauses have continued to be
used to protect some tribunals (especially those in the area of labour relations and
employment law) from judicial review, except for jurisdictional error. However, over the
last 20 years there has been a general growth of statutory appeals on questions of law from
other administrative tribunals to the courts.
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ambiguities. The Report shows similarly little understanding of the
institutional character of the more sophisticated administrative agencies,
and why an essentially curial model of procedure does not satisfactorily
address many of the procedural and substantive issues that face
regulatory bodies. McRuer regarded administrative tribunals as essen-
tially court substitutes, to be used when the value of the rights at stake,
or the likely volume of claims to be handled, did notjustify invoking the
courts, except as a last resort to resolve questions of law.
To the extent that it was either impracticable or undesirable to reduce
through statutory rules the administration of a programme to a series of
justiciable issues, McRuer concluded that any residual discretion
involving a significant degree of policy choice should be exercisable by
ministers. It was both necessary, and sufficient, that the exercise of
political power was subject to political accountability through the
traditional political institutions and processes. Thus, McRuer opposed
conferring on independent tribunals substantive rule-making power, and
thought that the checks imposed through the Legislative Assembly on
the making of delegated legislation by the executive rendered a general
notice and comment requirement superfluous.
Twenty five years on, it is clear that the goals of ensuring effectiveness,
efficiency, fairness and democratic legitimacy cannot be met in the
contemporary administrative state through a combination ofjudicialized
public administration and the traditional political process. Indeed, like
Dicey, McRuer tended to overlook the complexities and varieties of the
governmental machinery that he was describing.
In areas such as land-use planning and local government, and the
regulation of major utilities, for example, administrative agencies,
operating with a substantial measure of independence from the main line
departments, had for years exercised important policy-making functions.
Even in areas that appeared more obviously 'judicial', such as labour
arbitration and the regulation of labour relations by labour boards
composed of nominees of management and organized labour and an
independent chair, there had developed a body of procedures, interpre-
tative approaches and remedies that were informed by the experience and
perspectives of the specialized decision-makers, and that effectively
distinguished them from the ordinary courts of law.
(2) Appeals and review: a brief guide
To attempt here to describe with any degree of accuracy and
comprehensiveness the provisions for administrative appeal and review in
Canada today would be both tedious and unhelpful. Arrangements at both
provincial and federal levels of government have been made without any
articulated body of principles of institutional design and without any agency
charged with keeping a watching brief on the operation of the administra-
tive machine. None the less, it is possible to identify some general patterns
in the absence and appearance of administrative appeals, and, when they do
exist, some recurring categories.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM
(a) Economic regulation
I include in this category the statutory regimes established for the
regulation of economic activity: the development, transmission to
market, and export of oil and natural gas, the regulation of the 'natural
monopolies' (electricity and gas, railways, and telephone services, for
example), broadcasting, competition, and issuing and trading in
securities. Typically, decisions are made by an independent administra-
tive tribunal with original jurisdiction. The hearings that are held before
individual orders are made (for example, to approve a tariff of rates that
the regulated industry may charge) can be lengthy and complex and can
involve a plethora of interested parties and interveners. Regulatory
agencies typically have their own staff to assist with the administrative
arrangements associated with managing the hearings, providing exper-
tise on technical matters, compiling summaries of the evidence, and
giving legal advice.
Over the years, many of these agencies have held non-statutory
hearings before formulating policies or guidelines to be used in the
exercise of their legal power to decide individual cases. For instance, the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission held
public hearings at which the representatives of the broadcasting industry,
public interest groups and interested individuals made submissions on
the Commission's draft policy respecting the minimum Canadian
content of programmes that would be required of broadcasters as a
condition of their licence.
Typically, there is no provision for a statutory right of appeal on the
merits from the decisions of these bodies to some other independent
tribunal. More common, however, is a right of the tribunal or of the
parties to refer questions of law and jurisdiction to the courts.
An oddity of Canadian administrative law is that there are a number of
statutory appeals from independent regulatory agencies to the Cabinet, at
either the provincial or federal level, depending on the jurisdiction within
which the agency operates. Cabinet appeals have been widely condemned
on the grounds that success often depends on short-term political
considerations of the most partisan kind, and Cabinet secrecy shrouds the
decision-making process." They are also said to undermine the morale of
agency members and staff, and to jeopardize the integrity of the agency
process. None the less, governments have been very reluctant to abandon
this instrument of ex post facto control over agency decision-making, and
tend to invoke as justification the conventions of the parliamentary system,
and the principle that significant issues of public policy should be decided by
" See in particular At Genfor Canada v Inuit Tapirisat of Canada [1980] 2 SCR 735 (duty
of fairness not applicable to a Cabinet appeal from a decision of the CRTC determining
telephone tariffs: the Cabinet's power was 'legislative' in nature).
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those who are responsible to the people through the legislature and the
conventions of cabinet government.12
(b) Land-use planning and environmental protection
As in most countries, the statutory regimes in Canada governing the
regulation of land use are extraordinarily complex; the appeal structures
alone are difficult to describe in a way that is suitable for present
purposes. In Ontario, there is a right of appeal to an independent
administrative tribunal, established at the provincial level of govern-
ment, against many land-use decisions by municipal officials and elected
councillors. For example, a local development plan, or a municipal
zoning by-law may be appealed on the ground that it is inconsistent with
a provincially approved plan, or is otherwise unlawful or unreasonable. 13
At the micro-level, an appeal may also be made to an independent
tribunal by a person who has been refused permission to sub-divide land,
or to use her land in a way that deviates somewhat from the requirements
of the applicable planning by-laws.
Independent administrative tribunals are also entrusted with responsi-
bility for deciding whether to grant the approval that is necessary before
development projects that are liable to have adverse effects on the
environment are undertaken. Some of these hearings have been
monumental in scale, lasting for three or four years. 14 Enormous sums of
public money have been spent on funding interveners, and on the
necessary preparations by the proponents. Many observers have
concluded that these trial-type hearings are a very poor way to make
public policy on important, technically complex and multi-faceted
issues.' 5 However, in a climate in which the traditional political process
seems to be able to muster very little public confidence, alternative
processes are far from clear.
(c) Professional and vocational licensing
The regulation of admission into the professions, and the administra-
tion of discipline to members against whom complaints of incompetence
or unethical conduct are made, are for the most part left to statutory
self-regulatory professional bodies. The investigation of complaints, and
the proceedings of the disciplinary committees that adjudicate charges of
12 See, for example, the Broadcasting Act SC 1991 c 11, which both authorizes the
Cabinet to issue to the CRTC 'directions of general application on broad policy matters'
(s 7), and retains the right of appeal to Cabinet from CRTC decisions (s 28).
13 There is no longer an appeal to the Provincial Cabinet from the decisions of the
Ontario Municipal Board; however, if the Minister certifies that a zoning by-law or a plan
may affect a matter of provincial interest, any decision of the Board is subject to Cabinet
review: see Planning Act RSO 1990 c P.13 ss 17(16)-(18), 34(27)-(29).
14 The best known is the hearing being held by the Environmental Assessment Board
into applications to log a vast area of northern forest; the Board is called on to formulate
and apply policy that will best accommodate in the public interest the competing claims of
(for example) the logging companies, Native peoples, local communities and municipali-
ties, and various recreational users.
15 See n 4.
M4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM
unprofessional conduct have become increasingly judicialized. A remark-
ably wide right of appeal hes from decisions of the disciplinary
committees of the various professional bodies to a court of general
jurisdiction.16 Courts have none the less sometimes wondered whether it
is appropriate for them to substitute their judgment on a matter that is
more within the expertise of the members of the committee than the
court.1 7 Interestingly, in the area of health discipline complainants who
are dissatisfied because the complaints committee of a College has not
referred a matter to the disciplinary committee have a right of appeal to
an independent board.18
In Ontario, there is a common pattern to many of the administrative
arrangements made for the licensing of vocations, trades and businesses in
the interests of protecting consumers from the dishonest, incompetent and
financially unstable. Licence applications are initially determined by
municipal or provincial government officials, as are decisions to revoke a
licence. Decisions that are adverse to the applicant or licensee are subject to
a de novo appeal to an independent administrative tribunal. There is
commonly a broad right of appeal from this tribunal to the courts. 19
(d) Labour and employment law
The tribunals established to regulate collective labour relations and to
protect individual employee rights for the most part determine disputes
between non-governmental actors. Of course, public authorities may be
involved as employers, although the employment relationship between
the Crown and its employees is governed by a separate legal framework
which is similar in many respects to that regulating other employment
relationships. 20
Thus, labour relations boards administer the statutory regime of
collective bargaining. This function is performed through the exercise of
powers to certify: the trade union chosen by a 'collective bargaining unit'
of employees to be their sole bargaining agent; to protect the rights
bargained for in the collective agreement; and to prevent unfair labour
6 For example, the Health Disciplines Act RSO 1990 c H.4 s 13(2) provides:
'An appeal under this section may be made on questions of law or fact or both and the
court may . . . exercise all the powers of the committee ... and for such purposes the
court may substitute its opinion for that of the committee.'
The bulk of the administrative law case load of the Ontario Court (General Division),
including both applications for judicial review and statutory appeals, is handled by a
three-judge Divisional Court; while a large number ofjudges rotate through this court, a
core of senior members sit regularly enough to acquire an expertise in administrative law.
17 See, for example, Re College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and K (1987) 36 DLR
(4th) 707 at 726.
s Health Disciplines Act ss 6-10.
19 For an overview of the provisions for review and appeal in professional and
vocational licensing, see Access! Task Force on Access to Professions and Trades in Ontario
(1989) ch 11.
20 For example, the Public Service Staff Relations Act RSC 1985 c P-35 creates a
regulatory regime that governs the collective labour relations of the federal Crown and its
employees.
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practices. Specialist boards perform these functions with respect to the
Crown and its employees.21 Legislation requires disputes arising from
the collective agreement to be referred to arbitration, and arbitration may
also be used when the parties are unable to agree on the terms of a new
collective agreement. Claims by employees that they have been denied
their statutory rights are adjudicated by officials with various titles such
as employment standards officers, 22 and adjudicators.23 These statutory
protections are particularly important for non-unionized employees.
There are generally no administrative appeals from the decisions of
these bodies, although grievances will reach arbitration only after often
elaborate domestic remedial provisions have been exhausted. Typically,
opportunities for judicial review are kept to a minimum by strong
statutory privative clauses.24 The administration of labour legislation,
and of the agreements made by the parties, enjoys a substantial degree of
autonomy from the rest of our legal system. It is quite common to find
that, in order to correct errors or to deal with problems of inconsistency,
these administrative agencies are given a statutory power to reconsider
their decisions, either at the instance of a party or on their own motion.
The principal check on the abuse of power lies in the tripartite
composition of many of the agencies: the presence on an arbitration or
labour relations board of representatives of labour and management, and an
independent chair, lends to the process a measure of internal democracy and
accountability. Given also that time is often of the utmost importance in
labour disputes, and that the employee or union is generally in the
financially weaker position, rights of appeal would seriously jeopardize
some of the essential statutory aims: facilitating the right of workers to be
represented by a union of their choice, keeping to a minimum industrial
disruption, and redressing some of the more glaring consequences of the
market power imbalance between labour and capital.
(e) Human rights
Over the last ten years in Canada there has been great interest in legal
protection against discrimination, particularly on grounds of race, ethnic
origin, religion, gender and sexual orientation. The areas of discrimina-
tion that have proved of most importance include employment, housing
and the provision of services. The statutory regimes aimed at the
elimination of discrimination have been strengthened since 1985 by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states in s 15 that
21 At the federal level, the relevant tribunal is the Public Service Staff Relations Board.
22 See the Employment Standards Act RSO 1990 c E.14.
23 See the Canada Labour Code RSC 1985 c L-2 s 242.
24 For example, Ontario's Labour Relations Act RSO 1990 c L.2 confers exclusive
jurisdiction on the Labour Relations Board to 'exercise the powers conferred on it by or
under this Act and to determine all questions of law and fact that arise in any matter before
it, and the action or decision of the Board thereon is final and conclusive for al purposes'
(s 108). It also provides that no decision of the Board shall be questioned or reviewed in any
court, and no proceedings shall be taken in any court, whether by way of a prerogative
order or declaration or injunction, to review the decision of the Board (s 110).
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everyone has the right to equality before and under the law, and has the
right not to be discriminated on grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex,
religion or political opinion. The Charter has enabled the courts to
scrutinize the validity of legislation on the ground that it is discrimina-
tory (including human rights legislation that is arbitrarily underinclusive
in its coverage),25 and has forced governments to identify and correct
discriminatory provisions in existing legislation. More generally, the
constitutional guarantee of freedom from discrimination has given an
enhanced public prominence to issues of equality.
Anti-discrimination legislation is typically administered by an agency
(normally called a commission) which is empowered to investigate
complaints of unlawful discrimination and to decide whether to refer the
complaint for adjudication. The commission is independent of the
government departments that have general responsibility in the areas of
equality and discrimination, and community relations. If warranted by the
evidence, the commission refers the complaint to a board of inquiry, which
holds a hearing to determine whether there has been a breach of the statute.
The proceeding is adversarial in form, with the commission having carriage
of the prosecution of the matter. Members of boards of inquiry are selected
from a panel of approved persons and appointed ad hoc to hear cases; they
serve in a part-time capacity and are often lawyers. 26
Appeals from decisions of the boards typically he to a court of general
jurisdiction and are often wide in scope, including questions of fact,
discretion and law. However, courts may be reluctant to reverse a
finding of fact by a board of inquiry which the board was better placed
to make. 27 This may be because the decision turned on the credibility of
a witness, who had been seen and heard by the board but not by the
appellate court, or because it was one that was essentially a matter of
human rights policy, on which the view of the specialist agency was
entitled to a measure of curial deference. The complainant has no right of
appeal against a decision by the commission not to refer the complaint to
a board of inquiry.
The administration of human rights statutes in Canada has become
increasingly problematic: many commissions have accumulated substan-
tial backlogs in their case load; delays seem endemic at all stages of the
process; and commissions are now increasingly asked to investigate
complaints of systemic discrimination, which raise issues of investigative
methodology, fact and law that are much more complex than those
raised by the kind of discriminatory conduct contemplated when the
25 See, for example, Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 728
(exemption of single gender sports teams), Haig v Canada (1992) 94 DLR (4th) 1 (omission
of sexual orientation from the statutorily prohibited grounds of discrimination).
' This description fits, for example, Ontario's Human Rights Code RSO 1990 c H.19,
and the Canadian Human Rights Act RSC 1985 c H-6.
27 This principle has been the subject of two recent decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada: Zurich Insurance Co v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) [1992] 2 SCR 321;
Dickason v University of Alberta (1992) 95 DLR (4th) 439. However, no such deference is
extended to human rights tribunals' interpretations of their enabling statutes: Canada
(Att-Gen) v Mossop [1993] 1 SCR 554.
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legislation was first enacted. 28 The reduction in the scope of the appellate
jurisdiction of the courts would help to a limited extent to reduce costs
and delays.
The Ontario legislation designed to eliminate gender-based inequali-
ties in pay has its own administrative structure. 29 The Equal Pay
Commission is the educational, investigative and prosecutorial branch,
while the adjudication of complaints is entrusted to the Pay Equity
Hearings Tribunal, which sits in panels of three. Members of the
Tribunal are drawn from management and labour, with an independent
chair. The Tribunal's decisions are protected from judicial review by a
privative clause. 3°
(f) Immigration and refugee determination
The Immigration and Refugee Board is Canada's largest administra-
tive agency by far. 31 On the immigration side of its jurisdiction, it hears
appeals on the merits from decisions made by officials within the
Immigration Department: the deportation of permanent residents, the
refusal of a visa to a sponsored applicant, and the refusal to admit a
person who either has a valid visa or has been recognized in Canada as a
Convention refugee.
These represent only a small proportion of the decisions made by
immigration officials; other decisions (such as the removal of illegal
entrants and overstaying visitors, the refusal of a visa to a person other
than a sponsored immigrant, or a refusal to vary a person's immigration
status while in Canada) are, with leave of the Court subject to judicial
review on limited grounds in the Federal Court of Canada. Decisions of
the Board are similarly subject to judicial review in the Federal Court,
but again only with leave of the Court. There is no appeal against a
refusal of leave and an appeal against a dismissal of the application itself
lies only if, when rendering a judgment, the judge certifies that a serious
question of general importance is involved! Considerations of cost, and
the substantial backlog of cases that has built up in the Federal Court,
have no doubt led to the strict limitation of access both to the courts and
to the administrative appellate tribunal.
Unlike the Appeal Division, the Convention Refugee Determination
Division of the Board has original jurisdiction to determine claims to
refugee status made at a port of entry, or by persons already in Canada.
Its decisions are subject to judicial review on the traditional grounds in
the Federal Court, but only with leave. On its refugee side, the Board has
no general jurisdiction to reconsider its decisions.
28 See the recent report of the Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force,
Achieving Equality: A Report on Human Rights Reform (1992).
29 Pay Equity Act RSO 1990 P.7.
30 Section 30(1) (the Tribunal's decision is 'final and conclusive for all purposes'). On the
limited effect of finality clauses on the standard of review see: Dayco (Canada) Ltd v CA W
[1993] 2 SCR 230.
31 The provisions described in this paragraph are found in the Immigration Act 1976-77
c 52 (as amended by Bill C-86, 1992) ss 82(1)-82(2), 83.
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(g) Police, parole and prisons
Arrangements exist at both the provincial and federal levels of
government in Canada for the independent investigation and adjudica-
tion of public complaints against the conduct of police officers. 32 A
guiding principle is that primary responsibility for dealing with
complaints rests within the force. Even when a complaint is referred to
the independent body, the initial response will normally be to attempt to
have the matter dealt with by senior officers. If this does not prove
satisfactory, the public complaints body may conduct its own investiga-
tion, although its substantive powers are frequently limited. There are
typically no rights of appeal from bodies of this kind, and applications for
judicial review are extremely rare.
Decisions over the grant and revocation of parole are made by an
independent agency, the National Parole Board. 33 The Board's proceed-
ings are conducted in accordance with the principles of procedural
fairness, including an oral hearing in many situations. However, the need
to protect the identity of those who supply valuable information often
means that applicants for parole, or those whose parole has been
revoked, can expect significant limitations to be imposed on the
disclosure of information in the possession of the Board when this might
prejudice sources of confidential information. 34 Again, there is no right
to an administrative appeal, and those dissatisfied with the Board's
decisions must resort to judicial review.
The administration of prisons has become increasingly subject to
judicialized procedures. Hearings are held to review inmates' confine-
ment in 'solitary', or other unusually oppressive conditions, and their
transfer to higher security institutions. 35 Prison discipline is also
administered by tribunals that conduct hearings. In substance, many of
these hearings are appeals from decisions taken by prison officials.
Because of the personal liberty interests involved, the Charter has had
an important influence on exposing the decision-making processes of
those administering parole and prisons.36
32 At the federal level, for example, see the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act RSC
1985 c R-10 (as amended by SC 1990 c 8). s 45(25) et seq.
33 Parole Act RSC 1985 c P-2.
34 Parole. Regulations s 17(5) permits the Board to rely on information without
disclosing it to the person concerned where the Board is of the opinion that disclosure could
reasonably be expected to 'threaten the safety of individuals' or to impede investigations by
inter alia revealing the source of information received in confidence. However, courts have
resorted to s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (no deprivation of liberty
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice) to justify their scrutinizing
more closely claims made under s 17(5), when non-disclosure would jeopardize the fairness
of the hearing: see, for example, Gough v National Parole Board [1991] 2 FC 117.
" See, for example, Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution [19851 2 SCR 643; Demaria v
Regional Classification Board [1987] 1 FC 74. And see A Manson 'The role of statutory duties
in prison transfer cases' (1992) 2 Admin L Rep (2d) 33.
" See, for example, n 34, and Howard v Inmate Disciplinary Court, Stony Mountain
Institution [1984] 2 FC 642.
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(h) Income security
This is the area of public administration in Canada where administra-
tive appeals are most prevalent. Typically, of course, the initial decision
on a person's entitlement to a benefit, or its amount, will have been taken
by an official in the relevant government department, or other
bureaucracy, on the basis of the file that has been compiled. The
following examples illustrate the variety of review mechanisms available
under Canadian programmes.
All Provinces have schemes for the compensation of workers injured
at work, which are typically administered by an agency that is
independent of the Executive. Until relatively recently, there were no
external appeals against these agencies' decisions, although most boards
developed a system of internal appeals. Indeed, board decisions are often
shielded by statutory preclusive clauses, which the courts have tended to
take more seriously than similar clauses in other labour-related
legislation. Workers' compensation is an insurance based scheme;
premiums have typically been set by reference to the level of successful
claims made against an industry as a whole, rather than to the record of
individual employers.
At one time, the Ombudsman investigated complaints by dissatisfied
claimants; however, this was never a very satisfactory alternative to an
independent adjudication by a specialist tribunal. As a result, Ontario
instituted a right of appeal to an independent tribunal, the Workers'
Compensation Appeals Tribunal, which hears appeals on the merits after
the board's internal appeal remedies have been exhausted. 37 Like other
agencies in the labour law area, the Tribunal is tripartite in composition,
and there is no appeal from its decisions to a court. Applications for
judicial review have met with little success.
Because an award in favour of a worker has no immediate effect on the
premium payable by the claimant's employer, the claim is generally not
opposed at the hearing by the employer. 38 As a result, it has been
necessary to develop procedures suitable for a more inquisitorial type of
proceeding. For instance, the Tribunal has assumed a positive responsi-
bility for ensuring that the cases that come before it are decided correctly;
the Tribunal does not necessarily limit its consideration to those issues
raised by the claimant and, when represented, the employer. The statute
has created the Office of Workers' Adviser to assist claimants.
39
Unemployment insurance is a federal programme, and is administered
at first instance by Ministry officials. There is a first level of external de
novo appeal to a tripartite tribunal, which is assembled ad hoc. A further
appeal on questions of law lies to an Umpire, often ajudge of the Federal
31 Workers' Compensation Act RSO 1990 c W.11.
38 However, this is likely to change if the government implements a proposal that
insurance premiums should be set by reference to the claims successfully made against
individual employers, rather than by the claim record of the relevant industry as a whole.
9 Workers' Compensation Act (n 37) s 96.
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Court of Canada, whose decisions are subject to judicial review in the
Federal Court of Appeal.
Welfare programmes are a provincial responsibility, although, because
partially funded by Ottawa, they must comply with federal statutory
standards. Eligibility and quantum are assessed by departmental officials,
whose decisions are reviewable on the merits by an independent
administrative tribunal. A further appeal lies from the tribunal to the
courts on questions that are not purely factual.40
(3) Some conclusions
It would be futile to attempt to extract from the patchwork of
provisions for administrative appeals that I have described above any
underlying body of principles from which it could be said to have been
designed. However, a few generalizations may be made.
First, the growth of the administrative state has eroded on a massive
scale the traditional Westminster model of democracy based on
parliamentary accountability for public policy. In most areas of public
administration in Canada, main line government departments have shed
much of their former responsibility for the formulation and implemen-
tation of policy. These are functions that to a large extent administrative
agencies perform, either at first instance or on appeal, in the course of
delivering the programmes entrusted to them.
Of course, agencies enjoy differing degrees of autonomy, and the
Executive can limit their independence in a variety of ways. For
example, through its control of the legislative process the government
can set the parameters of the regulatory agenda, and establish the legal
framework within which the agency must operate. The government's
powers over the purse and the appointment of members can also be
decisive in influencing the performance of administrative agencies.
Ministerial directives and guidelines on questions of policy, and
Cabinet appeals against agency decisions, can also serve to link agencies
more closely to the traditional political processes. None the less, there
have been debates from time to time, and in particular contexts, about
the constitutional propriety in a parliamentary system of leaving the
responsibility for making policy in areas of great public interest to
agencies which are not directly accountable to parliament. For the most
part, though, the openness of agency decision-making (in the contexts
of both general policy-making and its particular application) and
the opportunities for direct public participation are regarded as more
than adequate democratic alternatives to the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility.41
" For a typical scheme, see Family Benefits Act RSO 1990 c F.2 ss 14, 15.
41 See further H N Janisch 'Independence of administrative tribunals: in praise of
structural heretics' (1987) 1 CanadianJ Admin L & Practice 1; DJ Mullan in R Creyke (ed)
Administrative Tribunals: Taking Stock (1993). But.for a traditional rule-of-law hostility to
the issue by an agency of an elaborate and detailed 'policy statement', see: Ainsley Financial
Corp v Ontario Security Commission Ont Ct (Gen Div)'13 August 1993.
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Second, administrative appeals are generally not provided from
decisions of independent tribunals that exercise original or merits review
jurisdiction. However, appeals to the courts on the merits are common
from the decisions of tribunals charged with deciding a person's fitness to
practise a profession. Appeals are provided in these circumstances
because of the seriousness for the individual of an erroneous decision that
may prevent her from earning her livelihood, the essentially adjudicative
nature of the issues and, perhaps, a lack of confidence in the first level
decision-maker. The similarly broad right of appeal that is granted to
those found guilty of unlawful discrimination may be subject to the same
kind of explanations. Despite the width of these appeal rights, courts
have shown some deference to the findings of fact made by the agencies
in question. None the less, I suspect that the legislature is not about to
reduce the scope of appeal to errors of law, even though this would still
enable the appellate court to correct egregious errors of fact and
unreasonable exercises of discretionary powers.
Third, appeals to an independent administrative agency are commonly
provided from benefit-entitlement decisions that are made at first
instance within the bureaucracy of a government department: income
security and immigration, for example. Two factors seem to make
administrative appeals to independent tribunals appropriate in these
situations. First, the initial decision will often have been taken without
the procedural protections of a hearing: for example, the individual may
not have had full disclosure of the material on which the decision was
based, and an opportunity to respond. Second, the initial decision is
made within an institution that has, or is seen to have, an interest in the
outcome: fairness requires that such decisions should be open to
independent scrutiny on broad grounds.
The fourth general observation to be made is that the roles assigned to
the courts under the various statutory schemes described in this paper
vary widely. Some statutes confer the broadest possible right of appeal
on the merits, while others confine the courts to the narrowest scope
permitted by the constitution, review for jurisdictional error. However,
in practice, the scope and intensity ofjudicial review are not perhaps as
different as the diversity in their statutory terms of reference would
suggest.
Whatever the statutorily prescribed scope ofjudicial review, the courts
are particularly interested in issues of procedural propriety, the
interpretation of legislation, and unreasonableness in both fact-finding
and the exercise of discretion. Conversely, even when there is a broad
right of appeal, courts may be reluctant to substitute their view of the
facts for that of the agency. 42 Variations in the scope and intensity of
judicial review tend to be differences of degree, rather than of kind.
42 See n 27; see also Union Gas Co of Canada v Sydenham Gas and Petroleum Co [1957]
SCR 185 (whether 'public convenience and necessity' justifies the construction of a gas
pipeline was not a question of fact, and therefore was not subject to appeal).
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Naturally, this is not to deny that cases can be won and lost by virtue
of the particular statutory definition of the role of the court in reviewing
the decisions of the agency in question. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Canada has recently stated that reviewing courts should normally show
deference to an administrative tribunal's interpretation of its own
legislation only if its decisions are protected by an ouster clause. 43 None
the less, it is important to bear in mind that other considerations may also
shape a court's response: its view of the competence of the agency to
decide the issue in dispute, the precision of the language of the enabling
statute, the nature of the individual rights at stake, the reputation of the
agency and the thoughtfulness of its reasons for decision, and the degree
of administrative disruption and delay likely to be occasioned by judicial
intervention, for instance.
(4) Does it work?
It would be a nigh impossible task to provide within the confines of
this paper an answer to the question: has Canada developed a system of
appeals and review that works? To start, one would need to define the
objectives that administrative appeals and judicial review should serve.
My definition of these would include: improving the quality of the
decisions made in terms of accuracy of fact-finding, consistency, fidelity
to statutory mandate, thoughtfulness in the exercise of discretion, and
respect for fundamental rights; and ensuring that appropriate procedures
are observed that enhance the reliability of the agency's decisions, its
democratic legitimacy, and its legal and political accountability. At the
same time, any successful system of review must also provide value for
money, that is, the benefits that it brings must more than offset the
inherent costs of a second look. I include in the category of 'costs' items
such as delay, diversion of resources, strengthening the position of
already powerful interests at the expense of the less well placed, and the
risk that, because external reviewers may not appreciate the problem in
all its ramifications, the second decision may be worse than the first.
The absence of any sustained empirical research makes it impossible to
assess to what extent Canada's arrangements for review and appeal are
achieving any of these objectives. Indeed, it is in my view a grave
deficiency that we have no kind of mechanism for monitoring the
operation of the administrative system with an eye to quality control and
value for money. A study commissioned by the government of Ontario,
Directions: A Review of Ontario's Regulatory Agencies (the Macaulay
Report), recommended in 1989 the creation of a body with co-ordinating
and overseeing functions with respect to the Province's tribunals. In
particular, Macaulay lamented the lack of attention paid to the
recruitment and continuing education of tribunal members and to the
development of a satisfactory career structure, the needless proliferation
of tribunals and procedural rules, and the failure to develop principles of
tribunal accountability.
" Canada (At Gen) v Mossop (n 27).
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Otherwise, one is left with anecdotal and impressionistic evidence
about the efficacy of Canada's appeal and review provisions. For the
most part, there is no clamour to add new layers of appeal where none
now exist; even the demands at one time made by refugee activists for an
appeal on the merits from the rejection of claims by the Immigration and
Refugee Board are seldom heard today. I suspect there is a broad
consensus to the effect that what ails administrative decision-making in
Canada is unlikely to be cured by restructuring the existing provisions
for appeal and review. It will be more profitable to improve the
performance of the tribunals that we have by focusing attention on the
sorts of issue identified by Macaulay and others.
As for the role of judicial review, there is, in my view, only a weak
case for maintaining rights of appeal from independent administrative
tribunals on questions of fact, and on the merits of the exercise of
discretion; the costs are apt to outweigh the benefits. Under the
Judicature provisions of our constitution, judicial review for jurisdic-
tional error is guaranteed, at least in respect of tribunals created by
provincial legislation. In addition, because it is part of the constitution
and as such is the supreme law of the land, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms effectively ensures that judicial redress is available
in the event that an administrative agency violates a constitutionally
protected individual right.
Thus, the only legislative choices to be made are from among the
provision of a right of appeal on questions of law, statutory silence on
access to the courts from the tribunal in question, and the insertion of a
privative clause restricting judicial review to procedural unfairness and
other species of jurisdictional error. Increasing the specialization of the
courts that exercise appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over the
administration would, I believe, be a step in the right direction towards
ensuring that judicial review makes its proper contribution to achieving
the objectives of the administrative system. 44
III LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA?
Before considering what lessons for the design of provisions for appeal
and review of administrative decision-making in the new South Africa
may be suggested by Canadian experience, it is worth noting two points
made in a recent article by Terry Ison. 45
First, he argues, arrangements for appeals and review should be
regarded primarily as part of the decision-making process and substan-
44 The Federal Court of Canada has virtually exclusive jurisdiction to review
administrative action taken by federal agencies, and since these cases comprise the largest
part of its docket, the Court can be considered to be a specialist in administrative law.
Moreover, an unusually high percentage of its judges have been appointed from the public
sector: the federal civil service, administrative agencies and the Cabinet, for example.
Ontario's Divisional Court is no more than 'semi-specialized' (see n 16); the Ontario Court
of Appeal, and the courts in other provinces, remain truly generalist. For a comparative
perspective, see S H Legomsky Specialized Justice (1990).
'PT G lson 'Appeals on the merits' (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ 139.
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tive content of the particular programme, and assessed in terms of their
'fit' within that scheme. An approach to institutional design based on
'general principles' may hold powerful attractions for lawyers, but is
liable to be overly concerned with issues of individual 'fairness' and
insufficiently attentive to the needs and diversity of programmes.
Second, Ison reminds administrative reformers that the best option for
any given programme may be that there should be no external review of a
decision. He points out that appellate provisions carry inevitable costs, of
the kind outlined earlier in this paper, and suggests that the existence of an
appeal to an outside body may divert attention from ensuring that the
primary decision-making processes are as open, accountable, reliable and
effective as possible. He would confine the courts to the smallest role that is
consistent with the constitution, because of their limited institutional
competence to improve the ability of agency performance, the strong
ideological commitment of the common-law mind and methodology to the
preservation of private-law rights and the adversarial model of procedure,
and the delays and expense associated with litigation in the courts.
In my view, these arguments provide a useful antidote to the ingrained
habits of thought of many lawyers and administrative law reformers.
Moreover, I am sympathetic to Ison's 'particularist' approach to the
creation of rights of appeal and review. However, the arguments seem to
me to be overstated, and out of step with the importance attached by
those shaping the future South Africa to the independent review of
government decision-making.
I would suggest that both appeal on the merits and judicial review have
useful contributions to make in any system of public administration with
objectives that include openness of process, accountability, consistency,
fidelity to the expressed will of the legislature, and a respect for rights
and values that transcend those that are of most immediate concern to the
agency. The challenge is to ensure that these objectives are pursued at the
least cost to agency effectiveness and egalitarian aspirations, and with
appropriate regard to the public resources available.
(1) Appeals on the merits
By 'on the merits', I mean an appeal that requires the appellate body to
determine whether the first instance decision-maker found the facts and law
correctly, 46 and to substitute its view of the proper exercise of any
discretion.
(a) No role for the courts
It is difficult to think of a situation in which it would be appropriate to
provide an appeal on the merits from an administrative decision to a
' I am not concerned here to distinguish among the different kinds of appeal on the
facts. Suffice it to say that they range from factual redeterminations de novo, to appeals in
the strict sense that are limited to the identification of errors made by the tribunal in the
facts found, perhaps aided by fresh evidence that was not available at first instance, but
without regard to events occurring after the decision was made.
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court of general jurisdiction. Courts are too costly to be used to correct
isolated errors, and are inaccessible to most citizens. Nor is there is any
reason to believe that courts possess institutional characteristics that
make them appropriate for this expansive role in a decision-making
process that the legislature has thought fit to entrust primarily to a
specialist administrative body.
(b) Few appeals from independent administrative agencies
When responsibility for initial decision-making has been entrusted to
an independent administrative agency it will rarely be justifiable to
provide for an appeal on the merits, 47 provided that the agency has full
fact-finding powers, allows for a proper degree of participation by those
affected by its decisions, and provides reasons on request.
A power to reconsider decisions may be a more cost effective means of
correcting errors. Multi-member agencies that sit in panels may also
develop other strategies for ensuring that inconsistencies are minimized
and panel decisions are informed by other agency members' experience.
Such strategies may include the issue of interpretative guidelines and
policy statements; the review by agency staff of draft reasons for
decision; and meetings of the full agency to consider cases that a panel has
heard, but not yet decided.
Concerns about the 'acceptability' of an administrative decision that is
not subject to an appeal may be met by ensuring that the members of the
tribunal have the personal qualities, skills and knowledge necessary for
their task. It is also important to ensure that agencies' membership is
drawn from as broad a cross-section of society as possible, including,
where appropriate, persons whose experience will enable them to form
a sympathetic understanding of the position of those whose cases they
must decide. A combination of full-time senior tribunal members, and
part-time, or shorter term, appointments may provide the right blend of
continuity and professional expertise on the one hand and the diverse
perspectives of community representatives on the other.
(c) Appeals from 'closed' bureaucracies
Appeals on the merits are liable to be most appropriate when the initial
decision concerns individual statutory entitlements or liabilities, and has
been made within a government or municipal department or some other
'closed' bureaucratic structure. It seems to me doubtful whether any
amount of internal quality control will ever satisfy the legitimate claims
to 'fairness' by the recipients of an unwelcome decision, especially when
the decision-maker is also in reality the claimant's opponent. However,
because the effectiveness of a right of appeal as a remedy depends on the
resources, both material and personal, of individuals, it is important that
7 An appeal to an independent tribunal may be justified when, for example, the initial
decision is taken at a local level, and the view of a regional or national body is regarded a
valuable.
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continuing efforts are made to minimize errors at first instance and to
provide internal checking mechanisms.
(d) A single appeal tribunal?
An important issue is whether administrative appeals should be
centralized within a single institution, along the lines of the Administra-
tive Appeal Tribunals that have been pioneered in Australia at both the
federal and state levels of government. Without a fuller understanding of
the operation of these bodies, I simply do not know whether the
Australian model is likely to suit South Africa better than the more
traditional network of specialist tribunals. However, my inclination is
for the latter.
48
I suspect, for example, that it may be easier for smaller and more
specialized bodies with lower public profiles to develop procedures that
are appropriate for their functions. A criticism made of the AAT is that
it has clung too closely to a formal and adversarial model. 49 It is also
easier to ensure local access to smaller, specialized tribunals than to a
large, centralized body. I wonder, too, whether a centralized appeals
'body is likely to be as sensitive as single focus appellate bodies to the
nuances of all the programmes from which appeals arise. 5° Australian
experience also indicates that the existence of a centralized administration
review body, such as the AAT, does not altogether dispense with the
need for an intermediate level of specialist appeal tribunals.5 Another
consideration is that of expense.52 In the year 1990-91, the AAT alone
had a budget of approximately $12.5 million.5 3 Lastly, South Africa
already has a number of specialist appeal tribunalsM and unless there is
reason to think that they cannot satisfactorily be adapted to the new
' A view that I subsequently discovered is shared by the South African Law
Commission (Working Paper 34), and by fellow panelist Karthy Govender (see Govender's
paper in this volume). But see L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 267-72 who, after noting
some of the difficulties, favours the adoption of a centralized appeal tribunal with
incremental additions to its jurisdiction. And for a balanced, but favourable account, see
Cheryl Saunders' paper in this volume.
'9 See, for example, M Allars 'The Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal:
procedure and review' 1990 Public Law 172; L Curtis 'Crossing the frontier between law
and administration' (1989) 58 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 57-8;J M Sharpe The
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Policy Review (1986) 16-18.
so On the other hand, excessive specialization and fragmentation within a centralized
tribunal may erode some of the advantages of such a body, that is, the ability to bring to
particular issues a perspective informed by a broad experience with issues of public
administration.
5 Specialized tribunals exist to hear appeals from departmental decisions in respect of
social security, veterans' benefits, student assistance, and migration.
s This is likely to be of particular concern in South Africa, both generally because of the
high demands that programmes of social reconstruction will place on limited resources,
and, more particularly, because of the size of a centralized tribunal that would be needed to
review decisions of public administration at the national and sub-national levels of
government.
" Administrative Appeals Tribunal Annual Report for 1990-91 58-9.
54 Baxter (n 48) 180-3, 262-7.
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constitutional and administrative regimes, there is something to be said
for working from a familiar, functioning model.
(e) Other structural and procedural issues
Of course, answering the question of whether to adopt a single
institution or a multiplicity of administrative review tribunals only starts
to address the issues. How best can we reconcile the desire for
informality and accessibility with the fair resolution of those complex
issues of fact, law and policy which the administration of modern
regulatory and benefit-conferral programmes inevitably produces? What
should be the terms of appointment and qualifications of tribunal
members, and who should appoint them? What should be the
relationship between the tribunal and the legislature: are accountability
and independence necessarily irreconcilable objectives? Should the appeal
be de ncvo, or restricted to the material that was before the body a quo?
To what extent should the tribunal defer to any government policy
relevant to the making of a discretionary decision?5 5 Without a context,
thinking about these and similar questions cannot be pursued very far
beyond rather mundane generalities.
(2) Judicial review
(a) Scope
Other papers in this volume deal fully with the grounds of judicial
review and so my remarks about the role of the courts can be brief. The
principal purpose served by judicial scrutiny is to ensure that
constitutional values are observed by agencies of the government in their
administration of statutory programmes. By 'constitutional values' I
mean to include respect for the duly expressed will of the legislature, for
the established relationships among the organs of the state, for the
democratic foundations of the state, and for basic human rights.
The legitimacy of the judiciary's assumption of this role rests first and
foremost on its institutional independence from the other branches of
government, and on the confidence of the public. In addition, the
breadth of experience that generalist judges bring to a problem can be a
valuable counterbalance to a 'tunnel vision' tendency amongst adminis-
trators. The openness of the judicial process also gives to the courts a
claim to play at least a residual role in overseeing the exercise of public
power.
As we are all aware, however, a surfeit of judicial review can be as
damaging as its absence. I have already indicated that I do not favour
ss This issue has proved particularly troublesome to the AAT: for a recent contribution
to the debate, see I Thompson & M Patterson 'The Federal Administrative Appeals
Tribunal and policy review: a re-assessment of the controversy' (1991) 2 Public Law Review
243. It has surfaced less frequently in Canada. When it has, the courts have said that
tribunals may take relevant government policy into account, but, in the absence of a
statutory direction to the contrary, may not regard it as binding: Innisfil (Township) v
Vespra (Township) [1981] 2 SCR 145. See generally, J M Evans et al Administrative Law:
Cases, Text and Materials 3 ed (1989) 680-5, and n 41.
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using this expensive and unwieldy mechanism to remedy factual errors,
or to provide a second opinion on the appropriate exercise of a discretion.
Whether the courts' scrutiny of administrative decisions should be
confined to issues of jurisdiction and rationality (however defined),
procedural fairness and constitutionally protected rights, or expanded to
an appeal on all questions of law is best resolved within particular
decision-making contexts.
(b) Constitutional status
A further question for consideration is whether the courts' jurisdiction
to review administrative action should be in some way constitutionally
entrenched.
(i) Canada
The Canadian constitution provides two bases for judicial review.
First, provincial legislatures cannot oust the supervisory jurisdiction of
the superior courts to review for jurisdictional error the decisions of
administrative tribunals that otherwise have been validly created by
provincial statute. This constitutional limitation on legislative compe-
tence was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada comparatively
recently in Crevier v Attorney General of Quebec.
5 6
The textual origin of the constitutional right to judicial review on
jurisdictional grounds is to be found in the judicature provisions of the
constitution, and in particular in s 96 of the Constitution Acts
1867-1982, which vests in the federal executive the authority to appoint
thejudges of the superior, county and district courts. Over the years, this
apparently simple appointing power has been given substantive content
by the courts.57 In order to prevent the provinces from undermining the
efficacy of this head of federal authority by eroding the power of
federally appointed judges, and transferring it to provincially appointed
bodies, the Supreme Court has held that no provincially created body
may exercise ajudicial power that is identical or analogous to one that has
historically been exclusively within the jurisdiction of a superior, county
or district court, unless it can be said to be an essential part and parcel of
an administrative scheme of regulation. This line of authority was
extended by the Court in Crevier to include a clause in a provincial statute
which, properly construed, completely removed an appellate adminis-
trative tribunal from review by the superior court in Quebec. For a
statute to confer on a provincially appointed body immunity from
judicial review, even for jurisdictional error, endowed the tribunal with
an attribute associated only with a superior court, and was to that extent
invalid.
Although this case may seem at first blush to be concerned with the
division of powers between the federal and provincial levels of
government, in the long run it is likely to be regarded as being more
56 [1981] 2 SCR 220.
17 See generally P W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3 ed (1992) 184-200.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OR JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 69
broadly based.58 It is not difficult to see in the court's reasoning the idea
that the rule of law in a democracy requires the judiciary, whose
independence from the executive is guaranteed by the constitution, to
ensure that administrative agencies with the power to determine
individual rights do not exceed their statutory powers. In effect, the
court elevated to the level of constitutional law what had previously been
a presumption of statutory interpretation applied to privative clauses.
The second restriction on the ability of legislatures to oust judicial
review of administrative action is derived from the paramountcy section
of the constitution, which makes it explicit that the constitution,
including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is the supreme
law of the land, and that any law that is inconsistent with it is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, of no force and effect.5 9 The relevance of this
provision for present purposes is that, since the Charter applies both to
provincial and federal legislatures and governments, it entrenches the
power of the courts to review the validity of statutes, delegated
legislation, tribunal decisions, or any other form of administrative action
by a governmental body, on the ground that they violate a right
protected by the Charter.
The following examples illustrate the impact that the Charter has had
on Canadian administrative law. A ban imposed by the manager of a
major airport on the distribution of leaflets in the airport was held to be
an invalid restriction of the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Charter. 6° Statutory limitations on public access to hearings held by
administrative tribunals have also been found to violate freedom of
speech, which includes freedom of the media. 61 The right to be free from
discrimination has been used to attack the exclusion of agricultural
workers from the jurisdiction of a labour relations board to certify a trade
union chosen by workers to be their collective bargaining agent, 62 and
the limitation to adoptive parents of a provision for parental leave.
63
Section 7 of the Charter is of particular importance in the context of
this discussion. It provides that everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person, and the right not to be denied those rights other
than in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The scope
of the phrase that triggers the application of s 7 review, 'life, liberty and
security of the person', will inevitably be the subject of judicial
elaboration over time. To date, however, it has been held to include: the
right of a claimant to refugee status not to be removed to a country
" However, unlike the English courts (see Page v University of Hull [1993] 1 All ER 97
at 106-7), Canadian courts have purported to maintain a distinction between review for
error of law, and review limited to jurisdictional error: see Canada (Att Gen) v Mossop
(n 43); and for a critical examination of the Court's prior decisions, see J M Evans
'Jurisdictional review in the Supreme Court: realism, romance and recidivism' (1991) 48
Admin LR 255.
59 Constitution Act 1981 s 52(1).
60 Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada [1991] 1 SCR 139.
61 Pacific Press Ltd v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1991] 1 FC 327.
62 See Cuddy Chicks Ltd v Ontario (Labour Relations Board) [1991] 2 SCR 5.
3 Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679.
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where she fears persecution, 64 a woman's decision not to continue her
pregnancy to term,65 and the grant and revocation of parole from
prison.66 'Property' was deliberately omitted from the list of protected
interests on the ground that it might unduly restrict public programmes
in such areas as land-use planning, environmental protection, the
regulation of industry, and employment and labour relations. However,
there is obviously no bright line to be drawn between liberty and security
of the person, on the one hand, and interests that have an economic
aspect on the other: examples include the practice of a profession, a
tenancy in public housing, and the receipt of social security benefits, for
example.67
Once an individual has established that the interest adversely affected
qualifies as 'life, liberty or security of the person', it must be shown that
the governmental action in question was not in accordance with 'the
principles of fundamental justice'. This phrase includes the duty of
procedural fairness as it is understood in administrative law.68 Thus, in
one of its most important early Charter decisions, the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down the provisions of the Immigration Act dealing with
the determination of claims to refugee status made by persons at a port
of entry, on the ground that the Act implicitly excluded an oral hearing,
and did not provide for proper disclosure by the Minister, before the
claimant was removed to the country of alleged persecution. 69 The
courts have also used the Charter to exact higher procedural standards
from bodies with the power over liberty and security of the person (the
administration of prisons, inmate discipline, and parole come particularly
to mind) than they might otherwise have done through the common-law
duty of fairness.
70
It is also clear that 'the principles of fundamental justice' are not
confined to matters of procedural fairness in the traditional sense. Rather,
they have been held to connote 'the basic tenets and principles ... of our
legal system', 71 and, in the context of administrative proceedings, have
included undue delay and unnecessarily vague statutory decision-making
standards.
72
64 Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177.
65 R v Morgentaler [1988] 2 SCR 30.
6 See, for example, Gough v National Parole Board [1991] 2 FC 117.
67 See further, I Johnstone 'Section 7 of the Charter and constitutionally protected
welfare' (1988) 46 Univerity of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 1; M Jackman 'The protection
of welfare rights under the Charter' (1988) 20 Ottawa L Review 257.
68 On the relationship between the constitutional and common-law standards of
fairness, see J M Evans 'The principles of fundamental justice: the constitution and the
common law' (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 51.
69 Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177.
70 Howard v Inmate Disciplinary Court, Stony Mountain Institution [1984] 2 FC 642.
71 Reference re Section 94(2) of the BC Motor Vehicle Act [19851 2 SCR 486 at 512 (per
Lamer J).
72 R v Morgentaler [19881 2 SCR 30; Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v Kodellas
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(ii) South Africa
The implications of entrenching in the constitution the courts' power
over public administration need to be carefully thought through. There
would seem to be three principal devices that could be used to secure
different degrees of constitutional entrenchment.
First, the paramountcy of the constitutional guarantees of whatever
fundamental rights are included in a bill of rights would in itself ensure
that the courts were not precluded from reviewing legislation and
administrative action on the ground that it violated a constitutionally
protected right. How much constitutional protection such a provision
gives would depend, of course, on the definition of the rights included in
the bill of rights. A concern to protect basic rights from arbitrary or
otherwise unfair infringement might be met by a clause similar in its
essential thrust to s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom from discrimination, and
freedom from arbitrary arrest or search and seizure, are also apt to be
important protections against the abuse of administrative power. The
crucial point to note is that it would not be open to parliament to
override by legislation the courts' determination that the design or
administration of a public programme violates a constitutionally
protected right.
Second, a new constitution could also provide that parliament may not
remove the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts over the administra-
tion. The Australian constitution does this by conferring on the High
Court the power to issue the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against federal officers. 73 A somewhat analogous result
has been reached in Canada by a more circuitous route. However, the
Supreme Court of Canada has as yet entrenched only review for
jurisdictional error by administrative tribunals of an adjudicative nature
created by provincial legislation. It is unclear to what extent, outside the
Charter, the constitution also guarantees the review for ultra vires of
other governmental action such as decisions of federal tribunals, or the
exercise of discretionary powers by Ministers.
The point to note here is that a constitutional ban on ouster clauses
does not prevent parliament from reversing a judicial ruling that an
administrative agency lacked the jurisdiction that it claimed when it
made the impugned decision. Amending legislation may expressly
expand the jurisdiction of the agency, or authorize it to perform its
statutory functions without complying with whatever procedural
requirement a reviewing court has held to be mandated by the duty of
fairness. Of course, parliament would be able to reverse a judicial
decision in this way only if the administrative action in question had not
infringed an interest that was independently protected by the bill of
rights.
The third, and by far the most expansive, form of entrenchment
would be to include in the constitution a provision to the effect that any
"' Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 s 75(v).
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person aggrieved by some administrative decision or action may seek
review in the courts on the grounds of procedural unfairness, illegality
and irrationality, or some combination or variation thereof. This would
in effect make the grounds ofjudicial review of all administrative action
part of the constitution. I know of no jurisdiction in which such an
extravagant grant of power over the entire administrative process has
been made to thejudiciary. Of course, the uniqueness of such a provision
does not necessarily prove its undesirability in the context of the new
South Africa. However, the implications of transforming every issue of
administrative law into a constitutional question are potentially so far
reaching that some at least should be spelled out. 74
First, since the content of the procedural duties owed by an
administrative agency would be determined by the court as a question of
constitutional law, parliament would be unable to amend the agency's
enabling statute in order to relieve it from a procedural requirement
imposed by a court as a matter of procedural fairness. Now, what
procedures it is appropriate to impose on an administrative agency in the
performance of its statutory duties ultimately involves a judgment
regarding where to strike the balance in any given context among
potentially competing objectives and values: the ability of the agency to
discharge its mandate effectively and efficiently, the public interest in
accurate and thoughtful decision-making, the interest of those who may
be affected by the agency's decisions in attempting to influence the
decision-maker, and the democratic claims of the wider public to
participate in the processes of government. Needless to say, the question
whether the right balance has been struck is one on which views may
legitimately differ. In my opinion it is not a question that the courts
should be handed the ultimate power to decide regardless of the nature of
the individual interests that the agency's decision may affect.
Let me give some examples. A multi-member administrative agency
that sits in panels (to decide disputes about land-use planning, labour
relations or social security benefits, for instance) may be concerned to
ensure that the decisions of its panels are consistent and well-informed.
Assume that in order to achieve this, the chair of the tribunal has required
those members who have heard, but not yet decided, cases that raise
important issues of agency law or policy to submit a draft decision for
discussion at a meeting of all the members of the agency, from which the
parties and their representatives are excluded. It is certainly conceivable
that a reviewing court might hold that this procedure was unfair. 75 The
effect of grounding in the constitution the procedural fairness of all
administrative decisions to which the common-law duty currently
applies, would be to remove from parliament the power to amend
"' The implications for the jurisdiction of a South African Constitutional Court may
also require consideration. If every administrative law case were also a case in constitutional
law, the Constitutional Court might find itself deciding run of the mill applications for the
judicial review of administrative action.
s Cf IWA v Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd [1990] 1 SCR 282; Tremblay v Quebec
(Commission des Affaires Sociales) [1992] 1 SCR 952.
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enabling legislation that would expressly permit an agency to adopt a
procedure which a court had held to be unfair, but which would greatly
enhance the quality of administrative justice in other respects.
Or, suppose that legislation were to provide that a local public inquiry
must be held to approve the route to be taken by a proposed new road.
The statute might be expected to stipulate that those objecting to the
scheme had a right to be heard before the scheme was approved. It is not
unknown for proceedings of this nature to attract considerable interest,
both from the owners of land that might be adversely affected, and from
public interest groups. Designing an appropriate procedure for conduct-
ing the inquiry requires a balance to be struck between the need to ensure
that the decision-making process is not unduly delayed by a proliferation
of lawyers and other 'experts' retained by those of financial means, and
the desirability of facilitating public participation in the processes of
government. Parliament should surely be able to overrule a court's
determination of how much cross-examination or disclosure of informa-
tion, for example, is required in this context to meet the demands of
procedural fairness.
As for judicial review on non-procedural issues, it might seem
desirable to limit the intensity or scope of the courts' scrutiny of the
decisions of certain tribunals. For instance, the standard of review of an
agency's findings of fact might be regarded as unduly intrusive in the case
of an agency which was required as part of its decision-making to
assemble a mass of complex technical information. Alternatively, it
might seem appropriate to limit the courts' opportunities to review the
decisions of a particular agency because of the disparate financial means
of the parties who typically appear before it, or because the virtues of
final decision-making by the tribunal are regarded as outweighing the
costs. A single, constitutionally entrenched standard of judicial review
applicable to all administrative action is likely to be incompatible with a
more functional, contextual and differential approach to the appropriate
degree of control exercised by the courts over the administration of
public programmes.
IV CONCLUSIONS
At the risk of compromising my philosophical inclination to the
principle of particularity in matters of public law and administration, I
firmly believe that an independent body, equipped to monitor and
co-ordinate the operation of whatever appeal and review provisions are
put in place, is crucial to the success of any administrative system. In a
sense, however, this idea may be regarded as a necessary corollary of the
former: if a thousand flowers are to be left to bloom, it is particularly
important that someone prunes and weeds! In order to establish the
significance of the functions to be performed by an administrative
council, and to provide some protection for its funding, it might even be
included in the constitution.
The precise powers and tasks of such a body, which would occupy a
place analogous in some ways to the Australian Administrative Review
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Council, obviously require more detailed and careful consideration than
can be given here. However, its mandate could include the recruitment,
terms of appointment and training of tribunal members; the co-
ordination of the procedural rules of agencies; 'hands-on' research and
the promotion of reform in the area of administrative law; a consultative
role on new legislation; and responsibility for monitoring the overall
performance and operation of the administrative appeal and review
system. 76
As for judicial review, the various proposals to entrench in the new
South African constitution a right to judicial review of administrative
action on grounds broadly corresponding to those developed at common
law, and modified by statute, seem to pay insufficient attention to some
important limitations on the efficacy of judicial review. First, there are
considerations of institutional competence. It is often difficult for lawyers
and judges who are looking at an administrative scheme from the
outside-perhaps for the first time and in the context of a worst case
scenario-to form an understanding of the scheme that will enable them
to fashion procedures, and to interpret the enabling legislation, in a way
most likely to further the effective and efficient implementation of the
programme.
Second, it is an almost inescapable feature of the litigation process that
it focuses attention on the interests that are represented in the proceeding,
and on the fairness of the administrative action vis-a-vis the individuals
most immediately concerned: the business person who has been deprived
of a licence, the owner of land who has been refused permission to
develop it, or the corporation that has been ordered to cease its
operations pending its compliance with a pollution control order, for
example. In contrast, the public interests promoted by regulatory
schemes are often represented only obliquely, and tend to be down
played or overlooked: consumer protection, effective land-use planning,
and a healthy environment, for instance. One does not have to assume
for the purpose of this argument that the judiciary will approach the
adjudication of disputes between individuals and agencies of the state
with a determination to thwart whenever possible the implementation of
the government's commitment to policies of redistribution, and social
and economic reconstruction.
Third, litigation is a particularly expensive and cumbersome way of
resolving disputes. Since it is used most frequently by the economically
powerful, it is not surprising that courts tend to see disputes involving
administrative agencies from the perspective of the regulated interests.
Inequality of access to the courts is certainly one important reason for
restricting the scope of judicial review over some administrative
agencies, especially those created in order to provide a relatively cheap
and expeditious forum for persons of modest means. Moreover, the
delays that inevitably attend applications for judicial review can seriously
76 Cf, for example, the proposal in Directions (n 9) ch 8.15 et seq for the creation of an
Ontario Council for Administrative Agencies.
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prejudice the effectiveness of an administrative scheme, regardless of the
success or failure of the particular application.
With the tentativeness appropriate to the partially informed outside
observer, I suggest that there are serious costs involved in entrenching in
the constitution a general right to judicial review on specified grounds of
all administrative action. Judicial resources, and the judges' stock of
political capital, should be concentrated on the protection of those rights
identified in the bill of rights as being of fundamental importance. Other
interests can be adequately protected through a reformed and modern-
ized administrative law that is based in statute and the common law, and
that remains subject to the ultimate control of parliament. A compromise
would be to include in the constitution a provision prohibiting legislative
attempts to entirely exclude judicial review of administrative action.
